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STEVEN C. WATERFIELD*
I. INTRODUCTION
By representing their clients, attorneys obtain information that benefits
their clients' cases. Yet if these clients want their attorneys to testify about this
information, the attorneys face almost certain disqualification. Consequently,
attorneys and clients are placed in difficult decisionmaking positions: an
attorney must decide early in the case whether his testimony will be necessary,
thus subjecting him to disqualification, while clients must consider whether to
obtain different, unfamiliar counsel, which may create economic and personal
hardships. The prohibition against allowing an attorney to serve as both an
advocate and witness is codified in the Disciplinary Rules of the ABA Model
Code of Professional Responsibility.' Disciplinary Rules 5-101(B) and 5-
102(A) require a lawyer, absent certain exceptions, to withdraw if he is to be
an advocate and witness in the same case.2 The Disciplinary Rules have also
* The author would like to thank his parents, Charles and Elaine Waterfield, and his
sister, Amy Waterfield, for their support and encouragement.
1 The ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility consists of Canons, Ethical
Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules.
The Canons are statements of axiomatic norms, expressing in general terms the
standards of professional conduct expected of lawyers in their relationships with the
public, with the legal system, and with the legal profession.... The Ethical
Considerations are aspirational in character and represent the objectives toward which
every member of the profession should strive.... The Disciplinary Rules, unlike the
Ethical Considerations, are mandatory in character. The Disciplinary Rules state the
minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to
disciplinary action.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY Preliminary Statement (1980).
2 DR 5-102 WITHDRAWAL AS COUNSEL WHEN THE LAWYER
BECOMES A WITNESS
(A) If, after undertaking employment in contemplated or pending litigation, a
lawyer learns or it is obvious that he or a lawyer in his firm ought to be called as a
witness on behalf of his client, he shall withdraw from the conduct of the trial and his
firm, if any, shall not continue representation in the trial, except that he may continue
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been used by courts to disqualify an attorney's firm from further representation
of the client.3 In general, the reasons for the advocate-witness rule are a desire
to protect the testifying attorney's client, the opposing party, and the public's
perception of the legal system and legal profession.4
In 155 North High, Ltd. v. Cincinnati Insurance Co.,5 the Ohio Supreme
Court used DR 5-102(A) to disqualify the appellant's attorney.6 The court held
that DR 5-101(B)(4) is an exception to the general rule requiring
disqualification, 7 and in doing so defined the terms "substantial hardship" and
"distinctive value" found in (B)(4). How a court defines substantial hardship
and distinctive value is pivotal in the application of the rule. Despite the
importance of these terms, courts have continually failed to define them with
the necessary precision that will enable attorneys to counsel their clients, and,
moreover, permit clients to select a course of action that best protects their
interests. In 155 North High, Ltd., the court favors a strict approach when
the representation and he or a lawyer in his firm may testify in the circumstances
enumerated in DR 5-101(B)(1) through (4).
DR 5-101 REFUSING EMPLOYMENT WHEN THE INTERESTS OF THE
LAWYER MAY IMPAIR HIS INDEPENDENT PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT
(B) A lawyer shall not accept employment in contemplated or pending litigation if
he knows or it is obvious that he or a lawyer in his firm ought to be called as a witness,
except that he may undertake the employment and he or a lawyer in his firm may
testify:
(1) If the testimony will relate solely to an uncontested matter.
(2) If the testimony will relate solely to a matter of formality and there is no
reason to believe that substantial evidence will be offered in opposition to the testimony.
(3) If the testimony will relate solely to the nature and value of legal services
rendered in the case by the lawyer or his firm to the client.
(4) As to any matter, if refusal would work a substantial hardship on the
client because of the distinctive value of the lawyer or his firm as counsel in the
particular case.
MODEL CODE Op PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101, 5-102 (1980). The Model Rules
counterpart to DR 5-101 and DR 5-102 is Model Rule 3.7. For a discussion of Model Rule
3.7, see infra Part V.
3 See Kalmanovitz v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 610 F. Supp. 1319 (D. Del. 1985);
Jones v. City of Chicago, 610 F. Supp. 350 (N.D. Ill. 1984). But see International Elecs.
Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1975).
4 See infra Part II.
5 650 N.E.2d 869 (Ohio 1995).




determining if the substantial hardship exception has been satisfied. Rather than
promote just results, the decision creates the opportunity for inflexible
injustices to occur that will create a substantial hardship for those who lose
their attorney through disqualification under DR 5-102. A more client-based
approach would better serve the rationales of the rule, and allow greater
flexibility in determining when an attorney should be disqualified.
This Comment will analyze the different approaches used to interpret the
substantial hardship exception and the reasons behind the advocate-witness
rule. Part I of this Comment looks at the rationales offered in support of the
advocate-witness rule, and whether these rationales are sound. Part I
examines the facts and reasoning of 155 North High, Ltd., while Part IV
discusses the Ohio Supreme Court's discussion of substantial hardship and
distinctive value in light of other jurisdictions' treatments of these same terms.
Finally, Part V offers an alternative approach to the present advocate-witness
rule.
If. RATIONALES SUPPORTING THE ADVOCATE-WITNESS RULE
A court's application of the substantial hardship exception partly depends
on how much weight the court gives the rationales supporting the advocate-
witness rule. Ethical Consideration 5-98 emphasizes three main reasons
supporting the advocate-witness rule: (1) to protect the client of the testifying
witness, (2) to protect the opposing counsel, and (3) to protect the public's
perception of the legal system.
A. Protecting the Client
Disqualifying the testifying lawyer prevents his client's case from being
8 MODEL CODE OFPROFESSiONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-9 (1980).
EC 5-9 Occasionally a lawyer is called upon to decide in a particular case whether he
will be a witness or an advocate. If a lawyer is both counsel and witness, he becomes
more easily impeachable for interest and thus may be a less effective witness.
Conversely, the opposing counsel may be handicapped in challenging the credibility of
the lawyer when the lawyer also appears as an advocate in the case. An advocate who
becomes a witness is in the unseemly and ineffective position of arguing his own
credibility. The roles of an advocate and of a witness are inconsistent; the function of an
advocate is to advance or argue the cause of another, while that of a witness is to state
facts objectively.
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harmed by the lawyer's interested testimony, since this interest makes the
attorney easier to impeach.9 One court has even concluded that the testifying
attorney's interest entirely destroyed the credibility of his testimony. 10
Supporters also claim that the testifying advocate, by being both a witness who
is an objective reporter of facts and an advocate who vigorously champions his
client's position may render the attorney less effective in these roles, thus
harming the client's case.11 Rather than benefitting the client, disqualifying his
attorney because of interest actually harms the client.
A disqualified attorney may still be impeached by opposing counsel if the
court allows counsel to testify because of counsel's continued interest in the
outcome of the case. 12 For instance, the attorney may represent the client in
other matters, or the attorney may still have a contingent fee pending on the
outcome. 13 Courts allow other interested parties to testify without disqualifying
them, yet lawyers are treated differently for no compelling reason. 14 Usually, a
witness will testify in a manner that strengthens the case for whom they are
testifying; if the concern is the witness's interest then every witness could be
disqualified. 15 Furthermore, the concerns regarding the harms caused by the
testifying; advocate remain speculative, 16 prompting one scholar to conclude
that the interest rationale no longer has any merit. 17
Losing his or her attorney of choice causes greater hardship on the client
than any benefit the client arguably gains from disqualifying the attorney
9 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 339 (1975);
John J. Dalton, The Advocate-Witness Rule: Problems and Pitfalls, C641 ALI-ABA 313,
325 (1991); Jeffrey A. Stonerock, The Advocate-Witness Rule: Anachronism or Necessary
Restraint?, 94 DicK. L. REv. 821, 850 (1990); Richard C. Wydick, Trial Counsel as
Witness: The Code and the Model Rules, 15 U.C. DAvis L. Ryv. 651, 660 (1982).
10 See Lah Ah Yew v. Dulles, 257 F.2d 744, 746-47 (9th Cir. 1958).
11 See Stonerock, supra note 9, at 850; Wydick, supra note 9, at 661.
12 See Harold A. Brown & Louis M. Brown, Disqualification of the Testifying
Advocate-A Firm Rule?, 57 N.C. L. REv. 597, 611 (1979).
13 See Stonerock, supra note 9, at 851.
14 See Stephen J. Butler, Comment, The Ride Prohibiting an Attorney from Testifing
at a Client Trial: An Ethical Paradox, 45 U. CN. L. REv. 268, 270 (1976).
15 See Greenebaum-Mountain Mortgage Co. v. Pioneer Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 421 F.
Supp. 1348, 1353 (D. Colo. 1976) (discussing the interest concern, the court states that
"[n]o litigant in a modern American court, however, would seek to dredge up that proposal,
for his own client would be barred from testifying for fear that he might distort the truth in
his quest for success at trial").
16 See id.
17 See 6 JoHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRiALs AT COMMON LAw § 1911, at 775
(Tames H. Chadbourn rev. 1976).
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because of interest concerns. Rather than serve the client's needs, the real loser
is the client who suffers economic and personal hardships when the advocate-
witness rule is applied. 18 Oddly, clients cannot waive application of the rule
even though the rule is aimed at protecting them.19 A better approach for the
client is to have the attorney inform him of potential dangers to his case if the
attorney served as advocate and witness. 20 If the client prefers to take the risk
that the attorney's testimony may be discredited, the client should be able to
keep the attorney as counsel. 21 If the attorney provides the client with bad
advice, then the client can file an ineffective assistance of counsel action against
the attorney. 22 The witness' interest will not go unchallenged since the
opposing party can challenge it on cross-examination and the trier of fact will
ultimately accord the proper weight to that testimony.23 The other concern, that
the attorney as an advocate and witness will be ineffective in these positions, is
18 See Stonerock, .supra note 9, at 853. According to another commentator, "[i]n
clumsy judicial hands, the rule has needlessly stripped clients of their trusted lawyers and of
the monetary value represented by their fee investment prior to disqualification." CH1RLEs
W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LGAL ETHncS 379 (1986).
19 See General Mill Supply Co. v. SCA Servs., Inc., 505 F. Supp. 1093, 1098 (E.D.
Mich. 1981), aftd, 697 F.2d 704 (6th Cir. 1982) ("[I]t is impossible for the plaintiffs to
waive the prejudice to the defendants, or the prejudice to the trial process."); Supreme Beef
Processors, Inc. v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1064, 1068 (N.D. Tex.
1977); Brown & Brown, supra note 12, at 602 ("[Tihe prevalent position is that although
these disciplinary rules are for the protection of clients, they are also for the protection of
the bar and the integrity of the court, and therefore may not be waived by the client.").2 0 See Butler, supra note 14, at 272.
2 1 See Note, The Advocate-Wtness Rlde: If Z, Then X But WI ?7, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1365, 1398 (1977) (footnote omitted).
The only viable rationale for prohibiting trial counsel from taking the witness stand is
the prospect that his credibility as both witness and advocate will suffer in the eyes of
the jury to the ultimate detriment of the client. But if the client is aware of such a
danger-that is, if he is fully and fairly informed of the implications of remaining with
the challenged attorney or firm-then no reason exists for taking the decision away
from the client and placing it in the hands of the court.
Id.; see also Wydick, supra note 9, at 661.
22 See Stonerock, supra note 9, at 855.
23 See General Mill Supply Co. v. SCA Servs., Inc., 505 F. Supp. 1093, 1096 (E.D.
Mich. 1981) (noting that plaintiffs understand that cross-examination will reveal their
attorney-witness's interest yet want to retain him as counsel); Butler, supra note 14, at 270;
John F. Sutton, Jr., The Tesd'ing Advocate, 41 TEx. L. REv. 477, 483 (1963).
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exaggerated, and does not support the rationales. 24 Essentially, the protection
of the client rationale offered in support of the advocate-witness rule could be
achieved by a more flexible process that really aims to protect the client rather
than force the client to endure substantial hardships.
B. Protecting the Opposing Party
Another rationale behind the advocate-witness rule is that it protects the
opposing party. 25 One belief is that the attorney for the opposing party is
placed in the difficult position of cross-examining a fellow bar member while
maintaining professional courtesy. 26 The testifying attorney, in turn, could
assert professional courtesy to frustrate the opposing attorney's cross-
examination, thus rendering it less effective. 27 However, one court was more
concerned that the opposing counsel's cross-examination would be too fierce.28
By preventing the attorney from testifying, the opposing counsel supposedly
maintains his objectivity, and thereby better serves his client's interests,29
creating a level playing field between the adversaries.
The concern that the opposing attorney will be placed in a difficult position
because he must cross-examine a fellow lawyer is unfounded. 30 Failing to
24 See Brown & Brown, supra note 12, at 609-10; Arnold N. Enker, The Raionale of
the Rule that Forbids a Lawyer To Be Advocate and Witness in the Same Case, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 455, 459-60.
25 See Cottonwood Estates, Inc. v. Paradise Builders, Inc., 624 P.2d 296, 300 (Ariz.
1981) ("When an attorney persists in acting both as witness and advocate, ordinary
procedural safeguards designed to give the parties a full and fair hearing become
problematic. For example, the familiar mechanics of question-and-answer interrogation
become impossible.").
26 See, e.g., Stonerock, supra note 9, at 857-58. Lawyers have a duty to treat other
lawyers with respect when acting as attorneys. See id. A main function of a cross-
examination is to test the credibility of the witness. See id. During cross-examination, a
testifying advocate can claim professional courtesy as an attorney which prevents the cross-
examining attorney from testing the advocate-witness's credibility as zealously as he
normally would because he does not want to discredit the advocate-witness or the legal
profession. See id.
27 See id. at 857. ("Allowing an attorney to testify could allow him to abuse
professional courtesy to blunt the opposition's cross-examination.").
28 See Jones v. City of Chicago, 610 F. Supp. 350, 362 (N.D. l. 1984)
("Embitterment between counsel ... is likely to occur when one counsel seeks to impeach
the credibility of opposing counsel acting as a witness.").
29 See Stonerock, supra note 9, at 857-58.
30 But see Dalton, supra note 9, at 322-23 ("While it is questionable whether an
attorney would sacrifice an ethical obligation to the client of zealously representing him for
1032 [Vol. 57:1027
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cross-examine completely the testifying attorney actually places the opposing
counsel in an ethical dilemma because of an attorney's duty to represent his
client zealously.31 Furthermore, even if the attorney is disqualified as counsel,
the witness remains an attorney still subject to professional courtesy, so the
disqualification achieves little, if anything, in support of this rationale. 32 Rather
than rely on the advocate-witness rule to protect the opposing party, rules of
evidence and the trial judge's supervision over the trial can offer the necessary
protection.33
Supposedly, the advocate-witness rule also protects the opposing party by
eliminating the possibility of the testifying witness offering opinion during his
arguments to the court.34 Related to this concern is the belief that jurors will
overvalue the attorney's testimony and arguments because the attorney can
defend his credibility during closing arguments.35 This enhanced credibility
assertion suffers from two main flaws. First, the trial judge, in his supervisory
capacity, would prevent the attorney from using his closing argument to
support his credibility. Second, whether a jury would place more weight on the
attorney's testimony ignores the reality that jurors will put more weight on a
witness's testimony for a variety of reasons.3 6 A jury may actually place less
the sake of courtesy to a fellow bar member, it can be a troublesome dilemma that distracts
from the purpose of the trial.").
31 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY EC 7-1 (1980) (Ethical
Consideration 7-1 states in pertinent part, "[tjhe duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to
the legal system is to represent his client zealously.... ."); see also Greenebaum-Mountain
Mortgage Co. v. Pioneer Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 421 F. Supp. 1348, 1354 (D. Colo. 1976)
("MThe duty of an attorney to his client, to represent the client completely and zealously as
required by Canons 6 and 7, easily outweighs and overcomes any professional loyalty.").
32 See Stonerock, supra note 9, at 858.
33 See id.
34 See id. at 858-59.
35 See Cottonwood Estates, Inc. v. Paradise Builders, Inc., 624 P.2d 296, 300 (Ariz.
1981) (discussing the dangers of allowing an attorney to testify, the court states that "Itlhe
advocate who testifies places himself in the position of being able to argue his own
credibility"); Stonerock, supra note 9, at 858-59.
36 See Stonerock, supra note 9, at 859-60 ("If a jury chooses to give unusual weight to
a counsel's argument, it is probably due to the counsel's method of presentation or his
reputation, and not because of an oath he took at some earlier point in the trial."); Wydick,
supra note 9, at 663. As one commentator observed:
The circumstance that he is both advocate and witness does not in itself enhance his
standing as a witness or make his advocacy more appealing. The appearance of a
particular lawyer as either a witness or an advocate may be influential with judge and
jury, by reason of reputation or personal magnetism, but it is difficult to see how the
1996] 1033
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weight on the attorney's testimony because of any perceived interest the
attorney may possess.37
C. Protecting the Public's Perception of the Legal System and Legal Profession
The most convincing rationale in support of the advocate-witness rule is
that the rule protects the legal system and legal profession from negative
images the public might have if the attorney was allowed to be both advocate
and witness. 38 Commentators agree that lawyers and the legal system have an
interest in preventing negative stereotyping.39 This interest is so significant that
support for the rule stems from a concern for any appearance of impropriety
rather than actual negative attitudes. 40
Whether the public, other than jurors in particular cases, have any
knowledge of the advocate-witness prohibition is questionable, 41 as is whether
fact that he simultaneously appears as both could increase his influence on the trier of
fact.
Sutton, supra note 23, at 480.
37 See supra Part lI.A. Those that support the rule cite two arguments in tension with
each other. They claim that an attorney will be less effective because he can be impeached
by interest. See Stonerock, supra note 9, at 850. Yet they also argue that the attorney will
be more effective in his closing arguments because this same interest supports his
credibility. See id. at 858-59.
38 Courts express a strong interest in maintaining the integrity of the legal system. See
Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160 (1988) (concluding that a criminal defendant
cannot waive his right to conflict free counsel because "[flederal courts have an independent
interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards of the
profession and that legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them").
39 See 6 WIGMORE, supra note 17, § 1911, at 775-76 (concluding that the interest in
protecting the legal profession "is at once the most potent and most common reason
judicially advanced"). As one commentator noted:
No doubt the lay observer's confidence in the judicial system is shaken when he
observes the advocate leave the counsel table to give testimony contradicting witnesses
for the opposition. The fear that the public will think lawyers distort the truth in favor of
the client, rather than any fear that lawyers do distort the truth, is one real basis for [DR
5-1021.
Sutton, supra note 23, at 482.
40 See Comden v. Superior Ct. of Los Angeles County, 576 P.2d 971, 973 (Cal. 1978)
("IThe prohibition seeks to avoid the appearance of attorney impropriety.").
41 See Note, supra note 21, at 1390 ("It is considerably less clear whether members of
1034 [Vol. 57:1027
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the public actually concerns itself when an attorney acts as an advocate and
witness in the same case. 42 Public perception is important, but the public will
view any witness as biased in favor of the party for whom he is testifying.43
Furthermore, the concern for the public's perception is based on an overly
cynical view of the public's opinion toward the legal system. The court in
International Electronics Corp. v. Flanzer44 cautioned against adopting an
unnecessarily cynical view:
Almost every party to a civil lawsuit (and his agents) is suspect of stretching
the truth for his own cause, and to the most cynical, the very service of the
complaint is a prelude to perjury. When we deal with what the public thinks,
we must be careful not to accept the view of the most cynical as the true voice
of the public, lest we accept a lack of faith in our institutions as a categorical
basis for restricting otherwise quite ethical conduct. 45
The costs to the client of a strict interpretation of the advocate-witness rule
outweighs any perceived benefits in protecting the public's perception of the
legal system and profession. 46 In fact, members of the public who lose their
counsel because of the advocate-witness rule will possess a more negative
attitude toward the legal system, viewing it as an inflexible, impersonal process
unconcerned with the client.47 The rule further damages the legal profession
the public who are not jurors have any knowledge of limitations on an attorney's courtroom
behavior, or even an intuition that it is somehow 'wrong' for an attorney to function as both
advocate and witness.").
42 See Stonerock, supra note 9, at 866 ("No evidence exists to show that the public is
concerned about attorneys testifying in the same case in which they are trial counsel. Such
public concern may be only a theory that attorneys impose upon themselves.").
43 See id.
44 527 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1975).
45 Id. at 1294.
46 See also Enker, supra note 24, at 459.
Protection of the profession's image seems at best a makeweight. Its force is a function
of the degree to which the forbidden practice is regarded as intrinsically wrongful.
Absent an explanation of the impropriety of the practice itself, the argument from
professional image hardly seems sufficiently potent to explain the intensity with which
the practice traditionally has been denounced.
Id.
4 7 See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 50 F.3d 1304, 1317
(5th Cir. 1995) ("Driven solely by undue preoccupation with the disqualification issue,
prolonged delay in addressing the merits of a case, in and of itself, can do little to install
confidence in the judicial system."); Stonerock, supra note 9, at 868 ("One public
10351996]
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because it presumes that lawyers "lack integrity," even when this is usually
untrue.48 Two commentators even claim that the rule itself perpetuates a
negative perception of the legal profession.49
Concern for the public's perception of the legal system and legal profession
is justified. However, protection of it must be tempered by an interest in
achieving just results. Striking a proper balance between these goals must be
achieved lest the client be subjected to unnecessary substantial hardships. A
better approach is to adopt a less stringent view of the substantial hardship
exception.50 Therefore, the client's interests are accounted for meaningfully,
and in those cases where the substantial hardship exception is not satisfied,
disqualifying the attorney will safeguard the public's perception in the legal
system and profession. Instead of this more moderate approach, the Ohio
Supreme Court adopted a strict interpretation of the substantial hardship
exception.
111. 155 NORTH HIGH, LTD. V. CINCINNATI INSURANCE CO.51
A. The Facts
On July 25, 1987 a fire completely destroyed property owned by 155
North High, Limited ("155 North High") and insured by Cincinnati Insurance
Company ("Cincinnati Insurance"). 52 After the fire, Charles Ruma, 155 North
High's general partner, contacted his attorney, James Wiles. 53 Ruma contacted
Wiles because of Wiles's expertise in large fire loss claims. Wiles had handled
over 200 fire-related cases involving claims for arson, product liability,
subrogation, severe personal injury, and death, including twenty-five to thirty
post fire insurance adjustment related claims. 54 Wiles, in turn, contacted
perception that does exist is that the law is replete with technicalities that sometimes produce
unfair results. Barring a witness from testifying because he is the trial attorney may impress
the public as such a technicality.").
48 See Stonerock, supra note 9, at 867.
49 See Brown & Brown, supra note 12, at 613 ("IThe rule is self-perpetuating: it is
unseemly for an attorney whose firm is trial counsel in the case to testify because there is a
rule of ethics to the contrary.").50 See infra Part V.
51 650 N.E.2d 869 (Ohio 1995).
52 The commercial insurance policy covered 1984 to 1987 and provided property loss
coverage and a special endorsement for rental value insurance. See id. at 870.
53 See i. at 870. Wiles remains a practicing attorney in the Columbus, Ohio firm of
Wiles, Doucher, Van Buren & Boyle Co., L.P.A. 13 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW
DiRECrORY OH 516B (1996).
5 4 See Appellant's Reply Brief at 2.
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Cincinnati Insurance's claim adjuster, Stephen Schwartz.55 In December of
1987, Cincinnati Insurance paid 155 North High $1,030,000, which
represented the full amount for property loss coverage, and $92,000 for the
rental value insurance.56 Despite these payments, the parties disputed the
amount still owed.57 As a result of this disagreement, in December 1988, 155
North High filed suit against Cincinnati Insurance alleging a bad faith breach of
the insurance contract stemming from Cincinnati Insurance's alleged delay and
intentional mishandling of the claims. 58 In its memorandum contra to
Cincinnati Insurance's motion for summary judgment, 155 North High attached
an affidavit from Wiles supporting its claims for breach of the insurance
company's duty of good-faith claims handling.59
In preparation for the trial, Wiles took Schwartz's deposition, which
suffered from lack of knowledge, memory, recall, and certainty of answers. 60
Therefore, after the depositions, Wiles listed himself as a potential witness in
the case.61 At trial before a common pleas court referee, Cincinnati Insurance
notified the referee that Wiles suggested that he might testify for 155 North
High. 62 In response, Wiles indicated that he did not know if he would testify
until he heard testimony from Cincinnati Insurance's witnesses, yet told the
trial referee that he did not feel that there would be a violation of any
55 One can question why Wiles did not take someone with him during these discussions
so this person could testify about the subject matter of the conversations, and Wiles could
remain 155 North High's attorney. Wiles probably did not take someone to accompany him
because he did not think that Schwartz would later suffer from a lack of memory regarding
these events. See Appellant's Merit Brief at 2-3. Moreover, since it is costly to bring
another attorney to these meetings, clients would balk at paying additional fees.
56 See 155 North High, Ltd., 650 N.E.2d at 870.
57 See id.
58 See id. The advocate-witness rule often arises in bad faith insurance claims cases.
See Timothy I. Fitzgerald, Ethics-It's Legal, But Is It Right?, in BAD FArrH LrriG. IN OHo
75, 77 (National Business Institute 1995) ("An attorney who involves himself in the initial
settlement negotiations of a claim may find himself or herself barred from trying the
subsequent bad faith case because of his or her status as an important witness to the
settlement proceedings.").
59 See 155 North High, Ltd., 650 N.E.2d at 870. The trial court ultimately denied the
motion for summary judgment. See id.
60 See id. Schwartz did little preparation for the deposition, testifying that "he did not
review his claim file (consisting of approximately 167 pages) in any detail; rather, he
'* * *just thumbed through it.'" Appellant's Merit Brief at 2. Schwartz's second deposition
was not any better, as it "contained over one hundred (100) lack of knowledge, memory,
recall, and certainty answers." Id.
61 See 155 North High, Ltd., 650 N.E.2d at 870.
62 See id.
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Disciplinary Rules if he did so.63 During the trial Wiles served as lead counsel,
and, eventually, on the trial's fourth day he stated his intention to take the
stand. 64 Though counsel for Cincinnati Insurance objected to Wiles's role as
advocate and witness, 65 the referee nonetheless deferred to Wiles's judgment in
overruling the motion. 66
63 See id. At trial, Schwartz, again, failed to recall the details of conversations between
Cincinnati Insurance and 155 North High. See Appellant's Merit Brief at 2-3. Wiles did not
think that he would be forced to testify because Schwartz claimed during his depositions that
he had only reviewed his file "briefly," indicating that thorough pre-trial preparation would
enable Schwartz to testify completely." Id. at 2-3. Furthermore, Schwartz never denied
having conversations with Wiles, he just could not recall the details. See id. at 2-3.64 See 155 North High, Ltd., 650 N.E.2d at 871. As lead counsel he conducted the
direct and cross examinations of most of the witnesses, including Schwartz. See id. During
questioning he asked Schwartz and others about conversations and meetings they had had
with him after the fire and up to the commencement of the suit. See id. at 870-71.
65 Motions to disqualify based on the advocate-witness rule often are filed for tactical
reasons. See J.P. Foley & Co. v. Vanderbilt, 523 F.2d 1357, 1360 (2d Cir. 1975) (Gurfein,
J., concurring) ("Mhe attempt by an opposing party to disqualify the other side's lawyer
must be viewed as a part of the tactics of an adversary proceeding."); Cottonwood Estates,
Inc. v. Paradise Builders, Inc., 624 P.2d 296, 302 (Ariz. 1981) ("By misusing the advocate-
witness prohibition, an attorney might elbow opposing counsel out of the litigation for
tactical reasons."); Brown & Brown, supra note 12, at 620 ("Even when the motion will
eventually be lost, there may be an economic incentive to make a disqualification motion
because the cost to the opponent of waging the battle may be quite large ... ."). As one
commentator observed:
Motions to disqualify have found favor as a delay strategy for many litigators. Some
attorneys also resort to such motions when facing more competent counsel then they
feel comfortable confronting. Counsel might even "set up" the opposition for
disqualification.... Courts have become increasingly alarmed at the increase in the
number of motions to disqualify opposing counsel. Many courts see these motions as
harassment tactics that, in the hands of an unscrupulous lawyer, can seriously
undermine a litigant's case.
Dalton, supra note 9, at 332-33.
The facts indicate that Cincinnati Insurance was well aware of Wiles's intention to
testify in case Schwartz remained unprepared, yet did not file a motion to disqualify Wiles
until the trial's fifth day. See Appellant's Merit Brief at 3 & n.2. Schwartz's lack of memory
may also have been the result of a strategical decision by Cincinnati Insurance. In fact,
Wiles considered Schwartz's lack of memory as "a stonewalling tactic by counsel for
[Cincinnati Insurance] to assist in settlement and that Schwartz's memory and preparation
would improve." Id. at 2.
66 See 155 North High, Ltd., 650 N.E.2d at 871.
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While on the witness stand, Wiles testified in detail about the conversations
he had with Schwartz, and what Cincinnati Insurance had done after the fire.67
After testifying, Wiles called 155 North High's final witness, and then rested
its case. Thereafter, Wiles cross-examined three witnesses that Cincinnati
Insurance called in its case-in-chief.68
At the conclusion of the trial, the referee found in favor of 155 North
High, and recommended that it receive $25,000 in compensatory damages and
$100,000 in punitive damages, a judgment which the trial court decided to
adopt. 69 On the second appeal, the court of appeals found that the trial court
committed prejudicial error in letting Wiles testify, and awarded Cincinnati
Insurance a new trial. 70 After this decision, Cincinnati Insurance filed a motion
with the Ohio Supreme Court to certify the record. 71
B. The Decision
Justice Francis E. Sweeney's opinion focused on DR 5-102(A),72 and the
substantial hardship exception found in DR 5-101(B)(4). 73 Since Wiles
possessed personal knowledge of the alleged facts leading to the allegation of
bad-faith handling of the claims, and participated in the negotiations and
dealings, Justice Sweeney stated that Wiles "ought to testify." 74 Wiles's




70 See id. In the first appeal, the court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part,
remanding two issues: (1) whether the referee erred in permitting Wiles to testify; and (2)
whether the record supported a finding that Cincinnati Insurance breached its duty of good
faith claims handling. See id. On remand, the trial court again adopted the referee's report,
and entered judgment for 155 North High. See id.
71 See id.
7 2 DR 5-102(B) did not apply because Wiles was called to testify on behalf of his client
rather than against his client. See id. at 871 n.2.
73 Exceptions found in DR 5-101(B)(1) through (3) did not apply to this case. See id. at
873 n.4.
7 4 Id. at 872-73. The "ought to testify" component of the rule has also been subject to
debate. See Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. American Gym, Recreational & Athletic Equip.
Corp., 546 F.2d 530, 538 n.21 (3d Cir. 1976). Though this portion of the rule offers fertile
ground for analysis, this Comment will not discuss it, limiting its focus to the substantial
hardship exception.
75 See 155 North High, Ltd., 650 N.E.2d at 872-73.
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developed in Mentor Lagoons, Inc. v. Rubin.76 First, the court must determine
the admissibility of the attorney's testimony without reference to the
Disciplinary Rules. Second, if the testimony is admissible, the opposing party
or court can move for the attorney to withdraw or be disqualified. Third, upon
such motion, the court must consider if any exceptions in the Disciplinary
Rules would permit the attorney to continue representation. 77 Based on this
analysis, Wiles would be disqualified unless the disqualification would work as
a substantial hardship on the client because of his distinctive value as a lawyer
in this particular case.78 To satisfy this exception there must be a showing that
because of the attorney's distinctive value a substantial hardship results to the
client if the lawyer is disqualified. 79 Because these terms had not yet been
defined by the court, the court drew from Ohio appellate court cases and cases
from other jurisdictions, and adopted a strict interpretation of substantial
hardship and distinctive value.80 After adopting this standard, the court
concluded that "[n]either familiarity with the case nor mere added expenses are
sufficient to prove this exception." 8' Other than this brief statement, the court
offered no further guidance for determining what distinctive value and
substantial hardship mean.
In addition to the court's failed attempt to define substantial hardship and
distinctive value, the decision ignored any meaningful application of the
rationales supporting the advocate-witness rule to the facts of the case. The
only rationale that has any merit is the concern for protecting the public's
76 510 N.E.2d 379 (Ohio 1987).
77 Id. at 382.
78 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101(B)(4) (1980).
79 See 155 North High, Ltd., 650 N.E.2d at 873. The hardship m=t be caused by the
attorney's distinctive value. If the client would suffer a substantial hardship, but the hardship
is not caused by the distinctive value of his attorney, the exception does not apply. See In re
Lathen, 654 P.2d 1110, 1114 (Or. 1982); MacArthur v. Bank of New York, 524 F. Supp.
1205, 1210 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
80 Nowhere in its decision did the court state that it was adopting the strict approach to
define substantial hardship and distinctive value. The court implies that it favors such a view
based on the cases it cites, which support characteristics of a strict approach, and its
discussion of these cases. See Supreme Beef Processors, Inc. v. American Consumer
Indus., Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1064 (N.D. Tex. 1977); Mentor Lagoons, Inc. v. Teague, 595
N.E.2d 392 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991); Schaub v. Mentor Lagoons Marina, No. 89-L-14-054,
1990 WL 71023 (Ohio Ct. App. May 25, 1990), aff'd, 573 N.E.2d 69 (Ohio 1991);
Richardson v. Board of Revision of Cuyahoga County, Nos. 38566, 38567, 38569, 38570
(Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 15, 1979); Warrilow v. Norrell, 791 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. Ct. App.
1989).
8 1 1.5 North High, Ltd., 650 N.E.2d at 874.
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perception of the legal system and legal profession. Wiles's disqualification did
not protect the client. 155 North High likely wanted to keep Wiles as its
counsel because of the attorney's relationship with the client, and his significant
preparation of the case.82 If the client was aware that Wiles's testimony would
be easily impeachable because of interest, yet wanted Wiles to remain as
counsel, then there is no harm to the client in allowing Wiles to testify and
remain as advocate. Wiles's disqualification also did not protect Cincinnati
Insurance. Nothing suggests that Cincinnati Insurance's counsel would be
handicapped in questioning Wiles. Furthermore, the weight accorded Wiles's
testimony would not necessarily be increased because of his role as advocate
and witness.
The best reason for disqualifying Wiles would be to protect the institutional
integrity of the legal system and the public's perception of the legal profession,
yet in this particular case, the facts suggest such protection would not be vital.
The trial originally took place before a common pleas court referee,8 3 therefore
no jurors were aware of Wiles's dual role as advocate and witness.84
Consequently, the public would not possess a more cynical view of the legal
system or legal profession since few would know of Wiles's roles in the case.
In sum, the legal system and profession do not stand to benefit significantly
from Wiles's disqualification.
By failing to apply the rationales behind the rule to the case, and most
importantly, ignoring more liberal approaches in defining substantial hardship
and distinctive value, the court defined these terms in a fashion that will
increase the likelihood of abuse in the application of DR 5-102 and DR 5-
101(B)(4). The court's decision establishes a definition of substantial hardship
that will actually work a substantial hardship on clients who lose their attorneys
under DR 5-102. Clients who lose their attorneys will face the economic costs
of obtaining new counsel, while also dealing with a delay in the resolution of
their disputes since the new attorney will need to familiarize himself with the
case.85 Furthermore, the loss of familiar counsel with whom the client has had
a long-standing relationship creates personal hardships for the client who must
82 At the time of the trial, Wiles had represented 155 North High for over twenty-five
months. See Appellant's Reply Brief at 2.
83 See 155 North High, Ltd., 650 N.E.2d at 870.
84 A trial can take place before a referee either when the parties are not entitled to a
jury trial or the parties consent in writing or in the record. See OhIo CIrv. R. 53(Q.
85 Based on the court's decision, people will conceivably need to retain two lawyers;
one for pre-trial negotiation and discussions, and another for the actual trial. As argued by
counsel for 155 North High, under the court's decision, "counsel for the insured could
never serve as trial counsel in any eventual litigation." Appellant's Reply Brief at 6.
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now navigate the legal system with an unfamiliar attorney. 86
IV. DEFINING "SUBSTANTIAL HARDSHIP" AND "DISTINCTIVE VALUE":
THREE APPROACIFS
Decisions defining substantial hardship and distinctive value generally fall
into three main interpretive categories: (1) a strict approach; (2) a middle
approach; and (3) a client-based approach.8 7 The strict approach uses an
extremely high standard for substantial hardship, which is rarely, if ever,
satisfied. The middle approach is more lenient in that it may permit the
attorney to continue representation up to the trial, but then disqualifies the
attorney thereafter. In doing so, the middle approach takes the client's interests
into account to some extent. In contrast, the client-based approach takes the
client's interests and preferences completely into consideration when
determining whether to disqualify the attorney. Consequently, the client-based
approach results in fewer disqualifications.
A. The Strict Approach
Applying the strict approach will always lead to disqualification of the
attorney. 88 Nevertheless, a strict interpretation of substantial hardship and
distinctive value is popular with courts.89 This strict approach, coupled with
86 But see Exparte Sanders, 441 So. 2d 901, 904 (Ala. 1983) ("This professional and
social rapport is desirable, and its absence may cause some inconvenience and anxiety, but
it certainly does not rise to the level of 'substantial hardship.'").
87 See Stonerock, supra note 9, at 838-39.
88 None of the cases that applied the strict approach permitted the attorney to remain
as counsel.
89 See Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. American Gym, Recreational & Athletic Equip.
Corp., 546 F.2d 530 (3d Cir. 1976); Draganescu v. First Nat'l Bank of Hollywood, 502
F.2d 550 (5th Cir. 1974); Kalmanovitz v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 610 F. Supp. 1319
(D. Del. 1985); Jones v. City of Chicago, 610 F. Supp. 350 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Teleprompter
of Erie, Inc. v. City of Erie, 573 F. Supp. 963 (W.D. Pa. 1983); MacArthur v. Bank of
New York, 524 F. Supp. 1205 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); General Mill Supply Co. v. SCA Servs.,
Inc., 505 F. Supp. 1093 (E.D. Mich. 1981); Supreme Beef Processors, Inc. v. American
Consumer Indus., Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1064 (N.D. Tex. 1977); United States ex rel. Sheldon
Electric Co. v. Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co., 423 F. Supp. 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1976);
Cottonwood Estates, Inc. v. Paradise Builders, Inc., 624 P.2d 296 (Ariz. 1981); Comden v.
Superior Ct. of Los Angeles County, 576 P.2d 971 (Cal. 1978); G.A.C. Commercial Corp.
v. Mahoney Typographers, Inc., 238 N.W.2d 575 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975); Tru-Bite Labs,
Inc. v. Ashman, 388 N.Y.S.2d 279 (App. Div. 1976); Town of Mebane v. Iowa Mut. Ins.
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the presumption against allowing the attorney to remain as an advocate, 90
results in an exceedingly rigid application of the rule. Upon applying the strict
approach, courts have disqualified attorneys who gained a familiarity with the
case through spending large amounts of time in case preparation, 91 or who
have a long-standing relationship with the client.92 Based on these outcomes,
commentators have criticized the strict approach because it "demands an
exceedingly high, probably impossible, and certainly inordinate showing of
hardship before the exception can be triggered." 93 One case that best
demonstrates the inflexible results of the strict approach is United States ex rel.
Sheldon Electric Co. v. Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co. 94
In this case the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York disqualified an attorney and his entire firm from continuing to
represent the plaintiff despite the plaintiff's ten year relationship with the law
firm, and the firm's approximately 450 hours of work expended in preparation
of the suit.95 Moreover, the court decided to disqualify the attorney and the
Co., 220 S.E.2d 623 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975); Mentor Lagoons, Inc. v. Teague, 595 N.E.2d
392 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991); Schaub v. Mentor Lagoons Marina, No. 89-L-14-054, 1990 WL
71023 (Ohio Ct. App. May 25, 1990); Richardson v. Board of Revision of Cuyahoga
County, Nos. 38566, 38567, 38569, 38570 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 15, 1979); In re Lathen,
654 P.2d 1110 (Or. 1982); Warrilow v. Norrell, 791 S.W.2d 515 (1ex. Ct. App. 1989);
see also Barbara I. Moss, Ethical Prohibitions Against a Lawver's Serving as Both Advocate
and Witness, 23 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 555, 561 (1993) ("[Mjany courts have been
reluctant to find a substantial hardship to the client that would permit the advocate to
continue representation where he or she is a material witness.").
90 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-10 (1980) ("Where the
question arises, doubts should be resolved in favor of the lawyer testifying and against his
becoming or continuing as an advocate.").
91 See MacArthur v. Bank of New York, 524 F. Supp. 1205, 1210 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(concluding that "[h]ardship alone, however substantial, is insufficient to permit continued
representation. The deprivation to the client will often be greatest precisely when the
attorney was most intimately involved in, and familiar with, the events giving rise to the
suit.").
92 See United States ex rel. Sheldon Electric Co. v. Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing
Co., 423 F. Supp. 486, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
93 See Sylvia Stevens, A Level Playing Field, OR. ST. B. BULL., Jan. 1995, at 33, 34
("Proving the disqualification will work a substantial hardship requires extreme and
exceptional circumstances. . . ."); Note, supra note 21, at 1375.
94 423 F. Supp. 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
95 See id. at 490.
In support of this contention plaintiff cites a ten-year history of representation by this
particular law firm and the approximately 450 hours of time expended in connection
with the multitude of claims that comprise plaintiff's case .... Yet, aside from these
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firm despite the fact that the opposition filed the motion to disqualify on the day
the trial began. 96
Another example of the unjust results created by the strict approach is
Draganescu v. First National Bank of Hollywood.97 This case involved a suit
by the plaintiffs for negligent failure to prepare a will. 98 Prior to her death, the
decedent hired an attorney specializing in the representation of Romanian
6migr~s and nationals. 99 The attorney contacted the defendant, First National
Hollywood Bank, to instruct it as to the specific terms and requirements of the
will. 1°° When the decedent died intestate, the plaintiffs, all Romanian nationals,
hired the same attorney who had originally contacted the bank. 01 Since the
attorney was apparently the only person who had spoken with the bank
regarding the will, he would testify at the trial. 102 The district judge ruled that
the attorney could not represent the plaintiffs since he was going to testify for
them.' 03 In denying the plaintiffs' motion to reverse the district court's order,
the court of appeals rejected the plaintiffs' contention that the substantial
hardship exception applied. 10 4 The plaintiffs argued that the attorney's ability
to speak Romanian, his long-standing relationship with the decedent, his
familiarity with representing Romanian nationals, and the reluctance of other
attorneys to take cases involving Romanians on a contingent fee basis rendered
him uniquely qualified to represent them.105 If the attorney was disqualified, it
would work as a substantial hardship on the plaintiffs precisely because of the
attorney's distinctive value. Completely ignoring the clients' interests in
retaining counsel, and the personal and financial hardships the plaintiffs would
general statements, the record is devoid of any indication of Fine, Tofel & Saxl's
particular value to plaintiff on the issue of the validity of the Release, and the Court
finds that the evidence before it is insufficient to allow the firm to continue
representation under the exception delineated by D.R. 5-101(B)(4).
Id.
96 See id. Such a decision suggests the tactical role a motion to disqualify assumes in
litigation. The record is unclear why the opposition waited so long to file the motion, but
strategy was undoubtedly a factor. For additional comments on the tactical use of motions to
disqualify, see supra note 65.
97 502 F.2d 550 (5th Cir. 1974).




102 See id. at 550-51.
103 See id.
104 See id. at 552.
105 See id.
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suffer, the court affirmed the attorney's disqualification. 106 Blackhawk Heating
& Plumbingand Draganescu exemplify the hardships a client faces if the court
applies a strict interpretation of the substantial hardship exception.10 7
Due to the court's disqualification of the attorney and his firm, the client
faces a lose-lose situation: he can either keep counsel and face possible
disqualification or he can obtain new counsel, increasing his costs. 10 8 Most
courts that adhere to a strict interpretation of substantial hardship believe that
recognizing delay and cost increases will render the rule ineffective. 10 9
Nevertheless, a client that loses representation from a firm that he had forged a
ten year relationship with, and is thus forced to obtain other counsel at
economic and personal costs, would consider the disqualification as working a
substantial hardship. 110 The potential for similar incredible results now exists
in Ohio because of the court's adoption of the strict approach to substantial
hardship. 1 '
In 155 North High, Ltd., the court explicitly rejected "financial hardship or
long-time familiarity with the case" as satisfying the (B)(4) exception. 112 The
court's interpretation runs directly counter to the American Bar Association's
(ABA) formal opinion discussing when a substantial hardship might exist. 113
Instances where the ABA suggests a substantial hardship would exist if the
attorney and firm were disqualified include (1) lengthy preparation of a
106 See id. at 553.
107 Broadly speaking, the main hardships a client suffers under the advocate-witness
rule are (1) loss of counsel that is familiar with the case and the client's past business or
litigation activities, (2) economic hardship that results when the client must pay for another
attorney, and (3) delays in the resolution of the dispute. Despite these hardships, courts
adopting the strict approach apparently consider the rationales supporting the advocate-
witness rule to outweigh the costs to the client.
108 See Dalton, supra note 9, at 330.
109 See, e.g., MacArthur v. Bank of New York, 524 F. Supp. 1205, 1210 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) ("But if the expense and delay routinely incident to disqualification satisfied the
substantial-hardship exception, that exception would soon swallow the rule."). Granted,
marginal delays and costs should not be given much weight under the substantial hardship
exception, but when 450 hours have been spent in preparation of the case, and the motion is
filed on the day of the trial, recognizing the inevitable delays and costs that result hardly
swallow up the rule's effectiveness.
110 See Brown & Brown, supra note 12, at 614.
111 No case was located that applied the strict approach yet permitted the attorney to
stay on as counsel. Thus, there is no way to determine what facts would actually constitute a
substantial hardship under the strict approach.
112 155 North High, Ltd., 650 N.E.2d at 874.
113 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 339
(1975).
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complex suit and (2) "a long or extensive professional relationship with a
client ... ."114 Wiles's long and extensive relationship with 155 North High's
general partner, Charles Ruma, means that 155 North High would suffer a
substantial hardship because Wiles was disqualified.' 15
The court's narrow interpretation also ignores the role that lawyers assume
when representing clients. During negotiations, settlement discussions, and
other meetings attorneys usually are the only witnesses for their clients as to
what transpires. 116 As two commentators noted, "an attorney's role as potential
witness is often part of his role as his client's representative."' 17 Furthermore,
clients want attorneys to play this specific role because of the attorney's
expertise in the legal field compared to the client's. Merely by serving his
client's needs, an attorney places himself in the position of being disqualified if
he must testify for his client.
Aside from the difficult choice the court's strict definition creates for the
attorney, another troublesome aspect of the decision is the court's failure to
develop any concrete guidelines that attorneys can follow in determining
whether they may face disqualification under the advocate-witness rule. For
example, the court merely says that "'substantial hardship' requires more
than.., mere financial hardship or long-time familiarity with the case," 118 but
what and how much more? Furthermore, the court fails to indicate how much,
if any, amount of time expended on a lawsuit would eventually satisfy the
substantial hardship exception." 9 The court offers the most guidance when it
concludes that to prove distinctive value Wiles would need to show "expertise
in a specialized area of law.' 20 A thorough understanding of patent law would
1 1 4 Id. (emphasis added).
115 Prior to this dispute, Wiles had done a significant amount of work for Charles
Ruma, 155 North High's general partner, in other matters. See Interview with James 1.
Brudney, Jr., Esq., Counsel of Record for Appellant in 155 North High, Ltd., in Columbus,
Ohio (Feb. 23, 1996).
116 See Brown & Brown, supra note 12, at 609-10. As noted earlier, making the
attorney bring a person with him in case an advocate-witness rule conflict subsequently
surfaces is economically impractical, and a burden on client and attorney.
117 Id. at 610.
118 155 North High, Ltd. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 650 N.E.2d 869, 874 (Ohio 1995).
119 See supra note 109 and accompanying text; see also Exparte Sanders, 441 So. 2d
901, 903-04 (Ala. 1983) (concluding that a 20 year relationship and 400 hours expended on
the case at the cost of $4,000 did not create a substantial hardship).
120 155 North High, Ltd., 650 N.E.2d at 874. Wiles possessed an expertise in fire-
related claims, having handled over 200 of them, including twenty-five to thirty post fire
insurance adjustment related claims. See Appellant's Reply Brief at 2. 155 North High
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apparently satisfy this definition, but one court still disqualified an attorney in a
patent case despite the attorney's knowledge of patent law. 121 A compelling
argument can be made that even expertise in litigation, usually not considered a
specialized area of law, should be enough to satisfy the substantial hardship
exception, since all litigators are not equal. 122 Yet the court, in its opinion
precludes such a finding. 123
The court's decision places the attorney in the position of defining the
terms substantial hardship and distinctive value even though the court claims to
have defined these terms. 124 Placed in the position of predicting whether a
court will find that the substantial hardship exception applies, an attorney will
have dual concerns. Not only must he represent his client, but if he concludes
that he may need to testify for his client, the attorney will also have to realize
that subsequent work may be costly for his client and himself if the attorney
fails to satisfy the substantial hardship exception. Either result exerts a hardship
on the client.
B. The Middle View
Taking a less stringent approach to the substantial hardship exception,
some courts have provided the client with some leeway prior to trial in
determining whether the attorney will be disqualified. 125 For example, in
Norman Norrell, Inc. v. Federated Department Stores, Inc. 126 the District
Court for the Southern District of New York allowed plaintiffs firm to
maintain representation of Norrell during the pretrial, but disqualified the
retained Wiles largely because of his expertise in fire-related claims. See Appellant's Merit
Brief at 1 n.1.
121 See Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. American Gym Recreational & Athletic Equip.
Corp., 546 F.2d 530, 538 n.21 (3d Cir. 1976); Connell v. Clairol, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 17,
19 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (stating that the substantial hardship exception did not apply since the
plaintiffs had not shown why other patent attorneys would be unable to handle the case).
122 Consider the differences between an experienced criminal defense lawyer, and a
young, court-appointed public defender. If an experienced lawyer was disqualified it would
certainly work a hardship on his client. See United States v. Baca, 27 M.J. 110 (C.M.A.
1988). Differences in attorneys' abilities also surface in civil cases. Clients select attorneys
precisely because some attorneys are better than others.
123 See 155 North High, Ltd., 650 N.E.2d at 873.
124 See aL
125 See Norman Norrell, Inc. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 127, 131
(S.D.N.Y. 1978); Miller Elec. Const., Inc. v. Devine Lighting Co., Inc., 421 F. Supp.
1020, 1023 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
126 450 F. Supp. 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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attorney and his firm for the actual trial. 127
Norman Norrell, Inc. involved an antitrust suit where the plaintiff sued the
defendant for damages as a result of the defendant's alleged coercion of the
plaintiff to accept an exclusive use agreement that allowed defendant to be the
exclusive retailer in the western United States for the plaintiff's garments. 128
Plaintiff's attorney and his firm regularly conducted Norrell's business affairs,
and the attorney also served as one of Norrell's corporate officers. 129 The
defendant sought to disqualify Norell and his firm because the attorney ought to
testify in the dispute due to his "unique personal knowledge of Norrell's affairs
and of the alleged violations." 130 Plaintiff and his firm argued the substantial
hardship exception, citing that the firm had been working without
compensation since 1974, and that it would be "impossible" to find another
firm "experienced in dress-business litigation" that would take the case on a
contingent fee basis.13
In a compromise solution, the court permitted counsel to continue to
represent the plaintiff during pretrial proceedings and before the trial
commenced, but disqualified the attorney and his firm for the actual trial.132 In
reaching the decision the court emphasized the substantial hardship that the
client would suffer if the entire firm was disqualified, but also noted the
importance in upholding the Disciplinary Rules that support the advocate-
witness rule. 133
Compared to a strict interpretation, the Norman Norrell, Inc. court's view
of the substantial hardship exception offers a more equitable solution to both
parties. The client of the disqualified firm gains the benefit of the firm's
representation in preparation for trial, while the advocate-witness rule is
127 See id. at 131.
128 See id. at 128.
129 See id. at 128-29.
130 Id. at 129.
131 Id. at 130.
132 See id. at 131.
133 See i.
The total loss of Manning's services as attorney to himself in effect as client would
represent the loss of "distinctive" services indeed, for it can be expected that he will
pursue this matter with unique loyalty and diligence. Nevertheless, Manning is an
attorney and as such he is bound by the Code. The compromise he suggested hews to
the Code's ethical spirit without violence to "the client's" wishes, and it serves the
interests of substantial justice to both parties in this action.
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upheld, benefitting the opposing party, the legal system, and legal profession.
Still, this middle view ultimately leaves the client in the same position as the
strict interpretation-without his chosen counsel, and having to obtain another
attorney who is unfamiliar with his case.134 One commentator remarks that the
middle approach offers only a marginally better result. 135
Applying this middle approach to the facts in 155 North High, Ltd. results
in the same outcome the narrow interpretation produced. Since Wiles had
already participated in the pretrial preparation there was not an option to allow
him to remain as counsel prior to trial and then to disqualify him at trial.
Furthermore, regardless of which view was adopted; 155 North High still loses
its selected representation, and faces the hardships of finding new counsel and
delay in the resolution of its case. Though the middle view would not have
changed the result in 155 North High, Ltd., the approach is superior to the
strict view the court selected. Depending on the facts and timing of the motion
to disqualify, the middle view would partially diminish the hardship a client
suffers from disqualification by allowing the client's counsel to continue
representation. Moreover, it would support the court's desire to uphold the
advocate-witness prohibition since the attorney faces disqualification once the
trial commences.
C. The Client-Based Approach
Emphasizing the client's interest in retaining his or her chosen counsel,
some courts have interpreted the substantial hardship exception more liberally,
taking into account the client's preferences. 136 Unlike the other interpretations
134 Though one can argue whether the "middle view" is actually an offshoot of the
strict view, the separate classification is appropriate. The middle view does consider the
client's interests more fully than the strict approach because the court refrains from
disqualifying the attorney from the rest of the proceedings. As the Norman Norrell, Inc.
court provided, the attorney may continue to represent the client in preliminary
proceedings, yet is disqualified once the trial begins. During this period the client can obtain
new counsel, and the new attorney can "be brought up to speed" on the case from the
original attorney. Therefore, the unfamiliarity problem is partially mitigated.
135 See Note, supra note 21, at 1378-79 ("Although the ... compromise approaches
partially ameliorate the impact of the literalist interpretation, many clients may nevertheless
find themselves in the unhappy position of ultimately losing their counsel of choice.").
136 See J.P. Foley & Co. v. Vanderbilt, 523 F.2d 1357 (2d Cir. 1975); Ampex Corp.
v. United States, 211 Ct. Cl. 366 (1976); Kenosha Auto Transport Corp. v. United States,
206 Ct. Cl. 888 (1975); Greenebaum-Mountain Mortgage Co. v. Pioneer Nat'l Title Ins.
Co., 421 F. Supp. 1348 (D. Colo. 1976); United States v. Baca, 27 M.J. 110 (C.M.A.
1988); Harris v. Superior Ct. of Santa Clara County, 158 Cal. Rptr. 807 (Ct. App. 1979).
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that ultimately ignored the client's opinion as to whether or not to disqualify his
counsel, the client approach specifically takes these preferences into
consideration. For example, in Greenebawn-Mountain Mortgage Co. v.
Pioneer National 7itle Insurance Co.,137 the United States District Court for
the District of Colorado held that plaintiff's attorney must be disqualified, but
did not disqualify the attorney's entire law firm. 138
The attorney in Greenebawn-Mountain Mortgage negotiated a construction
loan and escrow agreement that named the defendant as escrowee, and drafted
an agreement between the parties that became the focus of the litigation. 139 The
defendant, fourteen months after the complaint had been filed, moved to
disqualify the plaintiff's attorney and his firm under DR 5-102(A). 140 In
holding that the attorney must be disqualified, but that his firm could continue
to represent the plaintiff, the court recognized the substantial hardship the
plaintiff would suffer if the firm was disqualified, 141 and noted the client's
desire to have the firm continue its representation.' 42 Taking such items into
consideration contrasts sharply with the strict approach which ignores the
client's wishes and any hardship on the client.
Unlike the strict interpretive approach, another court has also recognized
that certain lawyers will offer a distinctive value to their clients because the
137 421 F. Supp. 1348 (D. Colo. 1976).
138 See id. at 1355.
139 See id. at 1349-51.
140 See id. at 1354.
141 See id. at 1352.
As to the fourth exception, it seems clear that there would be some hardship on Plaintiff
if its corporate counsel of long-standing could not prosecute the case. One reason for
maintaining a continuing relationship with a lawyer or law firm is to prevent the
difficulty which would ensue if each time litigation was commenced a new attorney
would be required to familiarize himself with the client and its business.... A client
who desires to head off a court battle should not be penalized for having the foresight to
employ legal counsel before the commencement of a lawsuit. Requiring a litigant to
change counsel when a suit is filed surely causes some degree of hardship.
Id.
142 See id. at 1354 (quoting Plaintiff's exhibit) ("Greenebaum 'desires the Law Firm to
continue its representation in this lawsuit regardless of the involvement of Kenneth M.
Robins.'"); see also J.P. Foley & Co., v. Vanderbilt, 523 F.2d 1357, 1360 (2d Cir. 1975)
(Gurfein, J., concurring) ("I would also direct the District Court to give the Foleys, after
affording them full information about the problem, a chance to express their own
preference.").
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lawyers possess more legal talent. In United States v. Baca,143 the United
States Court of Military Appeals concluded that disqualification of defense
counsel would cause a substantial hardship on the client in a criminal case
involving drunk driving and involuntary manslaughter. 144 The court noted that
the lawyer replacing the disqualified counsel had only been involved in the
defense for three days, and her legal experience was limited to motion
practice. 145 Because of the disqualified attorney's significant involvement in the
case, the court concluded that "removing Deardorff's services as defense
counsel 'would work a substantial hardship on the client because of the
distinctive value of the lawyer ... as counsel in the particular case.'" 146
Moreover, the court recognized that "[d]efense counsel are not fungible items.
Although an accused is not fully and absolutely entitled to counsel of choice, he
is absolutely entitled to retain an established relationship with counsel in the
absence of demonstrated good cause."147 The court's opinion is the best
example of a court interpreting the substantial hardship exception in favor of
the client's interest in retaining his preferred attorney. 148 The Baca decision
directly differs from the strict approach because the court recognizes that
143 27 MJ. 110 (C.M.A. 1988). Even though the Baca decision is from the military
courts it illuminates the discussion of the client-based approach because the court goes the
furthest in stating that the client's interests and abilities of counsel should be considered
when deciding whether to disqualify his attorney. In this respect, the opinion goes further
than any other case in advocating the client's interests. Whereas United States ex rel.
Sheldon Elec. Co. v. Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co., 423 F. Supp. 486 (S.D.N.Y.
1976), represents one extreme (an example of the strict approach), Baca represents the
opposite extreme. For other cases that apply a client-oriented analysis, see supra note 136.
144 Baca, 27 M.J. at 117.
145 See id.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 119.
Deardorff had represented Baca for some 5 months prior to his removal by the
military judge. As his affidavit vividly illustrates, these 5 months were very active
months in an effort to prepare a defense, and they were months during which Deardorff
came to establish a sincere professional concern for and sensitivity to his client's plight
of nonrememberance.
On the other hand Spahn had represented Baca for only 3 days when the litigation
giving rise to this appeal began. While the record reflects her as a competent and
dedicated defense attorney, it is impossible to speculate whether she pursued Baca's
interests in the same manner as Deardorff would have or arrived at the same end.
Id.
148 See Stonerock, supra note 9, at 839.
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familiarity with the case makes the attorney of distinctive value to the client,
and subsequent disqualification would work a substantial hardship on the client.
The liberal approach enables the client to prove the distinctive value of his
counsel more easily, which, in turn, allows the court to find the substantial
hardship exception applicable.' 49 Furthermore, the courts applying a broader
interpretation of substantial hardship usually place the burden on the party
claiming prejudice, rather than on the testifying attorney.150 Under the client-
based approach substantial hardship exception, the outcome in 155 North High,
Ltd. would be different. Though the client's interests in retaining his attorney
assume greater importance under the client-based approach, they are not
controlling. 151 Therefore, assuming that 155 North High wanted to keep Wiles
as its counsel, it would still have to show substantial hardship.' 52 The facts of
the case suggest a lengthy professional relationship between 155 North High
and Wiles. 153 Furthermore, Wiles's experience in dealing with fire loss claims
also indicates that Wiles offered a distinctive value to 155 North High. Wiles's
disqualification would exert a substantial hardship on 155 North High because
of this distinctive value. Thus, if 155 North High wanted Wiles to remain as
counsel, then Wiles would not be disqualified.
V. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
The results produced by a strict interpretation of the substantial hardship
exception renders the exception largely useless for most clients to whom the
advocate-witness rule applies. This rigidity, coupled with the vulnerability of
the rationales supporting the rule may lead to a conclusion that the advocate-
witness prohibition should be eliminated. If it was eliminated, then the judge's
supervisory capacity and the rules of evidence would facilitate the trial process
when the issue arose. However, eliminating the advocate-witness rule would
prevent any of the beneficial safeguards the rule does provide. 154 Therefore,
149 See Note, supra note 21, at 1383-84 ("The courts appeared willing to regard the
'distinctive value' component of that exception as satisfied simply by the fact that the client
had chosen and continued to rely on the contested counsel.").
150 See id. at 1384.
151 See J.P. Foley & Co. v. Vanderbilt, 523 F.2d 1357, 1360 (2d Cir. 1975) ("[The
client's] expression will, of course, not be binding on the court .... ).
152 See Note, supra note 21, at 1383 ("Of course, none of the... decisions held the
rule inapplicable .... ").
153 See supra note 115.
154 The main benefit is the protection of the legal system and legal profession, but
some cases would exist where disqualification is necessary to protect opposing counsel, or
to protect the client if he or she does not want the attorney to continue representation.
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the best solution would be a compromise between protecting the client's
interests and safeguarding the legal system and opposing counsel.
The balance between upholding the rationales supporting the advocate-
witness rule and protecting the interests of the client has been reached in the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.7. The Model Rules are the
product of the Kutak Commission, which was appointed in 1977 by the
ABA. 155 After several drafts, the ABA House of Delegates officially adopted
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct on August 2, 1983.156 As of
early 1995, 37 states had adopted the Model Rules. 157 However, many of these
states adopt the Rules with minimal to extensive variations, and still other states
have not adopted the Rules. 158 Since Ohio has not adopted the Model Rules,
155 North High, Ltd. was decided based on the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility. Model Rule 3.7 provides the Model Rules' version of the
advocate-witness rule.159 Conspicuously absent from Rule 3.7(a)(3) is the
"distinctive value" requirement found in DR 5-101(B)(4). Not requiring the
client to prove the distinctive value of his attorney produces a substantial
hardship exception that is easier to satisfy. 160 Furthermore, unlike the strict
155 See STEPHEN GILLERS & Roy D. SIMON, JR., REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES
AND STANDARDs 3 (1996).
156 See id.
15 7 See STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICs
5 (4th ed. 1995).
158 See id. California, for instance, has not adopted the Model Rules. Also, New
Mexico has adopted a version that is similar to the Model Rules provision, except that it
eliminates the substantial hardship exception. See N.M. RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT
§ 16-307 (1987).
159 Rule 3.7 Lawyer as Witness
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely
to be a necessary witness except where:
(1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services
rendered in the case; or
(3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the
client.
MODEL RULEs OFPROFEjIONAL CONDuCT RULE 3.7 (1995).
160 There are two other differences between the Model Rule and the Disciplinary
Rules. First, Rule 3.7(a) only disqualifies the attorney from the trial, not pre-trial work. See
MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucr RULE 3.7 (1995). In this sense, the Model Rule
resembles the Middle Approach discussed in Part IV.B. Second, Rule 3.7(b) indicates that
the rule only disqualifies the attorney rather than the whole firm. See id. The differences
between Rule 3.7(a) and DR 5-101 and DR 5-102 prompted two scholars to state that "Rule
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interpretation of DR 5-101(B)(4), a comment to Rule 3.7 expressly considers
the affect the disqualification will have on the client.' 6' The balancing approach
offers a more equitable approach to all parties, especially the client.
Given the balancing test approach suggested, a court could interpret the
interests of the client in such a fashion to render the rule "toothless." Whereas
the Disciplinary Rules create a rigid rule with harsh results for the client, the
balancing approach may lead to results that ignore the importance of protecting
the legal system, the legal profession, and the opposing party. 162 However, the
Disciplinary Rules are subject to abuse since they can be used as a tactical
weapon to disqualify an opposing party's attorney. 163 Moreover, the
Disciplinary Rules, when applied strictly, do not adequately consider the
client's interests, even though the rule is meant to protect these interests. 164
Each approach possesses flaws, but the Model Rules approach, offers a
solution that can protect the client, the opposing party, and the public's
perception of the legal system.' 65
3.7(a) is... more careflly tailored than its predecessors, DR 5-101(b) and DR 5-
102.... ." GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HoDEs, THE LAW OF LAWY.RING: A
HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFSSIONAL CoNDucr § 3.7:201 (Supp. 1994).
161 See MODEL RULF.S OFPROFSSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 3.7 cmt. 4 (1995).
[P]aragraph (a)(3) recognizes that a balancing is required between the interests of the
client and those of the opposing party. Whether the opposing party is likely to suffer
prejudice depends on the nature of the case, the importance and probable tenor of the
lawyer's testimony, and the probability that the lawyer's testimony will conflict with that
of other witnesses. Even if there is risk of such prejudice, in determining whether the
lawyer should be disqualified due regard must be given to the effect of disqualfication
on the lawyer's client.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Dalton, supra note 9, at 329.
162 An attorney may know that he will be called as a witness for his client, yet remain
as counsel. When the disqualification issue arises, he may be able to shield himself from
removal because it would work a substantial hardship on this client. Consequently, an
attorney acting purely in bad faith may be able to "beat" the rule.
163 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
164 The Disciplinary Rules emphasize protection of the legal system and the opposing
party. On the other hand, the Model Rules provision shifts the focus to the client. The
importance one places on these factors should dictate what view to adopt. The Model Rules
approach is superior because it focuses on the client's interests, yet does not ignore the
interests in protecting the legal system and opposing counsel. In contrast, the Disciplinary
Rules approach focuses on the legal system and the opposition, yet completely ignores the
client's interests.
165 Though Rule 3.7 does state that the client's interests should be considered, the
comment also instructs the court to consider the prejudice to the opposing party. To
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Ohio should adopt an approach identical or similar to the one provided in
the Model Rules. Under the Model Rules, disqualification of Wiles may have
caused a substantial hardship to the client depending on how long Wiles had
spent in preparation of the case, and the length of the relationship between
Wiles and 155 North High. Cincinnati Insurance would still gain protection
because the court would have to balance any substantial hardship with potential
prejudice to Cincinnati Insurance. Based on the facts, nothing appears to be
overly prejudicial to Cincinnati Insurance. Wiles's testimony would be
prejudicial to Cincinnati Insurance, but all testimony is prejudicial to some
degree for the party against whom it is being offered. Thus, under the Model
Rules, Wiles would not have been disqualified.
VI. CONCLUSION
155 North High, Ltd. shows that courts still favor a strict approach to
defining substantial hardship and distinctive value in DR 5-101(B)(4). The
results that the strict approach produces, however, often seem unjust when the
client loses an attorney with whom he has a long-standing relationship, or has a
unique knowledge of the case. One of the Ohio Supreme Court's main flaws
was its fhilure to define the terms substantial hardship and distinctive value
with meaningful clarity, which would allow attorneys to better conform their
actions to the rule. Aside from holding that DR 5-101(B)(4) is an exception to
DR 5-102(A), the court's opinion lacks any substantive information to guide
the lawyer when faced with the complex decisions concerning the advocate-
witness rule.
The court's casual acceptance that its decision supports the rationales upon
which the rule is founded is also troubling. The advocate-witness rule, as
applied, does not further the rationales that support the rule. 166 Even if the
interests are protected, they are done so at a cost to the client that outweighs
the benefits.
The court could have adopted two alternative approaches to decide the
case, either of which would be favorable to the reasoning it eventually adopted.
First, the court could have defined substantial hardship and distinctive value
under a client-based approach. In doing so, the court places more significance
on the client's interests. The problem with this solution is the potential for the
advocate-witness prohibition to lose all effectiveness in cases where an attorney
determine the potential prejudice to the opposing party depends on the nature of the case,
the nature and importance of the lawyer's testimony, and probability that the lawyer's
testimony will conflict with that of other witnesses. See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCt Rule 3.7 cmt. 4 (1995).166 See supra Part II.
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should be disqualified. The second, and best alternative, would be to adopt an
approach similar to the one defined in Model Rule 3.7. By eliminating the
distinctive value requirement and balancing the client's interests with the
interests in protecting the opposing party and the public's perception of the
legal system, a more equitable analysis is developed.
However, the Ohio Supreme Court adopted a strict interpretation of
substantial hardship and distinctive value, and failed to define these terms
adequately. Consequently, Ohio attorneys will have to grapple continually with
the difficulties posed when they may serve as both an advocate and a witness.
